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Abstract: This paper provides a non-linear pricing rule for the valuation
of assets on financial markets with intermediaries. The non-linearity arises
from the fact that dealers charge a price for their intermediation between
buyer and seller. The pricing rule we propose is an alternative for the well-
known no-arbitrage pricing on markets without frictions. The price of an
asset equals the signed Choquet integral of its discounted payoff with respect
to a concave signed capacity. We show that this pricing rule is consistent
with equilibrium. Furthermore, equilibria are shown to satisfy a notion of
constrained Pareto optimality.
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On financial markets without frictions, no-arbitrage pricing allows to price
non-marketed redundant assets using the equilibrium prices of the marketed
assets (see for instance Magill and Shafer (1991)). The equilibrium prices
of the marketed assets determine a (set of) risk neutral probability distri-
bution(s) such that the equilibrium price of a redundant asset equals the
mathematical expectation of its discounted payoff with respect to this (these)
probability distribution(s). This pricing rule is consistent with equilibrium
in the sense that, introducing a redundant asset at its no-arbitrage price does
not affect the equilibrium allocations (see for example Harrison and Kreps
(1979)). On markets with frictions however, a pricing rule will in general be
non-linear. Consider for example bid-ask spreads or transaction costs. Then
clearly prices (as a function of asset payoffs) are non-linear, since the price
an agent has to pay for buying an asset is strictly larger than the price an
agent receives for selling it. Therefore equilibrium asset prices cannot be
represented by the mathematical expectation of their discounted payoff with
respect to a probability measure.
In this paper, we propose a non-linear pricing rule that allows for bid-ask
spreads. This pricing rule essentially amounts to replacing the risk-neutral
probability measure appearing in no-arbitrage pricing by a concave signed
capacity1 ν. The price of an asset then equals the signed Choquet integral2,
which in general is non-linear, of its discounted payoff with respect to ν.
1Consider a measure space (Ω,A). A set function µ : A → IR is concave if for all
A,B ∈ A one has µ(A ∪ B) ≤ µ(A) + µ(B) − µ(A ∩ B). A set function µ is a signed
capacity if it satisfies µ(Ω) = 1 and µ(∅) = 0. Signed capacities generalize capacities since
they need not satisfy monotonicity with respect to set inclusion.
2See for instance Schmeidler (1986) for details on the Choquet integral, and De Wae-
genaere and Wakker (1996) for details on the signed Choquet integral.
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We define a market model with bid-ask spreads and show that the above
described pricing rule is consistent with General Equilibrium pricing in the
sense that: i) the equilibrium price of a marketed asset equals the signed
Choquet integral of its discounted payoffs with respect to an equilibrium
concave signed capacity, and ii) introducing a redundant asset at the price
equal to the signed Choquet integral of its discounted payoffs with respect
to this concave signed capacity does not affect the equilibrium allocations.
2 Choquet equilibrium prices
We consider a two period asset market model with dealers charging bid-
ask spreads, show that equilibrium exists, and give a characterization of the
equilibrium prices of the assets. There are J nominal assets, indexed by
j ∈ J := {1, 2, . . . , J}. The assets can be traded in the first period, and
yield payoff in the second period. There are S possible states of the world
at the second period, indexed by s ∈ Ω := {1, 2, . . . , S}. For simplicity
of notation, we assume that there are no spot markets, i.e. there is only
one good at each state of the world, and assets yield payoff in quantities of
this good. A consumption bundle is a vector x = (x0, x1, . . . , xS)t ∈ IR
S+1
+ ,
consisting of x0 units of the good in the first period, and xs units of the
good in the second period if state s occurs, for s ∈ Ω. The payoff of asset
j ∈ J is denoted by a vector Aj ∈ IR
S. The matrix of asset payoffs is
denoted A ∈ IRS×J . There are I agents, indexed by i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , I}
with utility functions ui : IRS+1+ → IR+. They have initial endowments
wi = (wi0, w
i
1, . . . , w
i
S)
t, i ∈ I, and maximize utility by trading asset portfolios
z = (z1, . . . , zJ)t ∈ IR
J .
The model differs from the standard incomplete markets model in the
sense that assets can only be traded through the intermediation of dealers.
Again for simplicity of notation, we assume that there is only one dealer. The
4
presence of a dealer is formalized by the fact that for each asset Aj, j ∈ J ,
there is a buying price q(Aj) and a selling price −q(−Aj). Typically, one will
have that q(Aj) > −q(−Aj), i.e. the dealer can make a profit equal to the
bid-ask spread γj := q(Aj)+q(−Aj), by buying the asset from an agent for the
price −q(−Aj) and selling it to an agent for the price q(Aj). Furthermore,
when a portfolio consisting of more than one asset is traded, the dealer
takes into account that hedging effects can reduce the risk of the portfolio.
Consequently, he might allow a price discount in this case. More precisely,
for a portfolio z ∈ IRJ , in general one will have that q(Az) + q(−Az) ≤∑J
j=1 |zj|(q(Aj)+q(−Aj)), i.e. the spread on a portfolio is less than or equal to
the sum of the individual spreads. When however the payoff vectorsX and Y
of two portfolios are comonotonic3, then V ar(X+Y ) ≥ V ar(X)+V ar(Y ), so
there is no hedging effect when combining the two portfolios. Consequently,
the dealer does not allow a price discount in this case. In short, we assume




P12) Sub-additivity, i.e. q(X + Y ) ≤ q(X) + q(Y ) for all payoff vectors
X, Y ∈ IRS.
P13) Comonotonic additivity, i.e. if X and Y are comonotonic vectors in
IRS, then q(X + Y ) = q(X) + q(Y ).
When the dealer charges spreads, the inequality in P12 will in general be
strict for non-comonotonic assets, and consequently, there is no probability
3Vectors X, Y ∈ IRS are comonotonic if (Xs−Xt)(Ys−Yt) ≥ 0 for all s, t ∈ Ω. When X
and Y denote payoff vectors of portfolios, then comonotonicity means that they increase
each others risk, since they move in the same direction.
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measure such that the price of an arbitrary portfolio equals the expected
value of its discounted payoff with respect to that probability measure. Con-
sequently, traditional no-arbitrage pricing cannot be used in this case. In
the sequel, we show how the signed Choquet integral can be used to value
portfolios on markets with frictions. Let us therefore first recall the definition
of the signed Choquet integral.
Definition 2.1 For any set function µ on (Ω, 2Ω), and any random variable
X on (Ω, 2Ω), the signed Choquet integral of X w.r.t. µ, denoted by
∫
Xdµ,
is defined as follows.
(i) Take a permutation ρ(.) on Ω that is compatible with X, i.e.
X(ρ(1)) ≥ · · · ≥ X(ρ(S)).
(ii) Define πρ(s) := µ({ρ(1), . . . , ρ(s)}) − µ({ρ(1), . . . , ρ(s − 1)}), for all
s ≥ 2, and πρ(1) := µ({ρ(1)})− µ(∅).






Notice that, if X(i) = X(j) for some i 6= j, then the rank-ordering ρ(.)
above is not uniquely defined. It is elementarily verified that then any rank-
ordering ρ(.) that is compatible with X gives the same result, so that the
signed Choquet integral is well-defined.
Notice furthermore that, when µ is a signed measure (i.e. µ is additive





s=1 µ({s})X(s), i.e. the signed Choquet integral equals the
Lebesque integral of X with respect to µ. Hence, when µ is a probability
measure, then
∫
Xdµ equals the expected value of X with respect to µ.
6
Since in our case, Ω = {1, 2, . . . , S}, and A = 2Ω, we can represent a
stochastic variable on (Ω,A) by a vector X ∈ IRS. Therefore in the sequel,
with slight abuse of notation, for any vector X ∈ IRS, and any set function
µ,
∫
Xdµ denotes the signed Choquet integral of the stochastic variable X̃
on (Ω,A) defined by X̃(s) := Xs, for all s ∈ Ω.
As stated above, with traditional no-arbitrage pricing, there exists a prob-
ability measure such that the price of an asset equals the Lebesque integral
of its discounted payoff with respect to this measure. In the sequel, we show
that, by replacing the Lebesque integral by the more general signed Choquet
integral, one obtains a pricing rule that is applicable to markets with frictions
as described above. The following lemma is crucial.
Lemma 2.1 A functional q : IRS → IR satisfies properties P1 if and only if
there exists a concave set function µ satisfying µ(∅) = 0 such that q(X) =∫
Xdµ, for all X ∈ IRS.
Proof: From theorem 1 in De Waegenaere and Wakker (1996), we know
that a functional q(.) can be represented as a signed Choquet integral with
respect to a set function µ iff q(.) satisfies P11 and P13. Clearly, without
loss of generality, one can take µ(∅) = 0. Given that q(X) =
∫
Xdµ for all
X ∈ IRS , it follows from theorem 3 in De Waegenaere and Wakker (1996)
that µ is concave iff the functional q(.) satisfies property P12. This concludes
the proof.
For this reason, asset valuation by means of a price functional q(.) that
satisfies P1 will in the sequel be called Choquet valuation, and the correspon-
ding functional will be called a Choquet functional.
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Corollary 2.1 For every Choquet functional q(.) that assigns a positive price
to the riskless bond, i.e. q((1, 1, . . . , 1)t) > 0, there exists a concave signed
capacity ν such that q(X) = q((1, 1, . . . , 1)t)
∫
Xdν for all X ∈ IRS.
Proof: From lemma 2.1 it follows that there exists a concave set function µ
satisfying µ(∅) = 0 such that q(X) =
∫
Xdµ, for all X ∈ IRS. By taking X =
(1, 1, . . . , 1)t, it follows that µ(Ω) > 0. Every concave set function µ satisfying
µ(Ω) > 0 and µ(∅) = 0 can be normalized to a concave signed capacity ν as





all X ∈ IRS , t ∈ IR, and any set function ν. This yields the desired result.
The above corollary shows that a dealer who uses Choquet valuation and
assigns a positive price to the riskless bond performs asset valuation in a way
similar to no-arbitrage pricing in the frictionless case, but with the probabi-
lity measure replaced by a concave signed capacity. The non-linearity of this
pricing rule then clearly generates profit for the dealer. We suppose that each
agent i ∈ I has a share ξi in the dealer’s firm, with
∑I
i=1 ξ
i = 1. After trade,
the dealer’s profit is redistributed amongst the agents proportional to their
shares. Keeping in mind lemma 2.1 this gives rise to the following definition.
Definition 2.2 A set function µ : 2Ω → IR is an equilibrium set function if
there exist consumption bundles {xi, i ∈ I}, asset portfolios {zi, i ∈ I}, and
dealer’s profit πd ∈ IR+ satisfying:
i) (xi, zi) ∈ argmax(x,z)∈Bi(µ,πd)u


















where, the budget set of agent i ∈ I is given by:
Bi(µ, πd) :=
(x, z) ∈ IRS+1+ × IRJ





xs ≤ wis + (Az)s, s ∈ Ω
 .
Before going to the main theorem, it is interesting to notice the following.
From theorem 5 in De Waegenaere and Wakker (1996) it follows that4, for
each price functional q(.) with properties P1, and therefore by lemma 2.1 for
every signed Choquet integral with respect to a concave set function satisfy-
ing µ(∅) = 0, there exists a vector π ∈ IRS, which can be interpreted as a vec-
tor of state prices, and a positive, continuous functional Ψ(π, .) : IRS → IR+,
such that q(X) = πX + Ψ(π,X), for all X ∈ IRS. Therefore, a dealer using
Choquet valuation applies a pricing rule that consists of a linear part, πX,
the ”price” of X, to which he adds a positive, sub-additive part, Ψ(π,X),
which represents the ”spread” he charges for his intermediation. For this rea-
son, Ψ(., .) will be called the spread functional. Now the following definition
follows naturally.
Definition 2.3 A spread functional Ψ(., .) : IRS × IRS → IR+ is compatible
with properties P1 if for every π ∈ IR
S, the functional q(.) := π. + Ψ(π, .)
satisfies properties P1. Let C denote the set of all set functions on (Ω, 2Ω).
The set functions that correspond to a given spread functional Ψ(., .) that is
compatible with P1 are given by C(Ψ) := {µ ∈ C| ∃π ∈ IR
S : πX + Ψ(π,X) =∫
Xdµ, for all X ∈ IRS}.
4It is shown in theorem 5 in De Waegenaere and Wakker (1996) that for a concave set
function µ satisfying µ(∅) = 0, the signed Choquet integral of a stochastic variableX with




XdP | P ∈ P(µ)
}
, where P(µ) = {P | P is an
additive set function such that P (A) ≤ µ(A) for all A ∈ A, and P (Ω) = µ(Ω)}.
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We will consider spread functionals that satisfy the following regularity prop-
erties.
Properties P2:
P21) Ψ(., .) is continuous.
P22) When {πn : n → ∞} is such that limn→∞(πnAj) = +∞(resp. −∞)
for some j ∈ J , then limn→∞ (−πnAj + Ψ(πn,−Aj)) = −∞ (resp.
limn→∞ (πnAj + Ψ(πn, Aj)) = −∞).
The intuition behind P22 is as follows. Suppose that there would be no deal-
er, i.e. Ψ(., .) = 0. Then it is well known that potential equilibrium values
for the asset prices qj := πAj are bounded. Indeed, a sequence such that
limn→∞ |qnj | = ∞ leads to unbounded aggregate demand for the good in at
least one state. Now P22 essentially says that the spread functional is such
that when the price of an asset becomes very high (resp. low), the net amount
received when selling it (price - dealer’s charge) gets very high (resp. the to-
tal cost for buying it (price + dealer’s charge) gets very low). Consequently,
spreads do not prevent that aggregate demand becomes unbounded.
Notice that properties P2 are satisfied for all spread functionals that are com-
patible with P1 and do not depend on π. A concrete example of a spread
functional that is compatible with P1 and satisfies P2 is given in section 4.
More general examples of spread functionals being compatible with P1 and
satisfying P2 can be constructed using theorem 5 in De Waegenaere and
Wakker (1996).




A1) The utility functions are continuous, strictly increasing, and quasi-
concave.
A2) The initial endowments are strictly positive, i.e. wis > 0, for all
i ∈ I and s ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , S}.
A3) There is no redundancy in the asset’s payoffs, i.e. rank (A)=J.
Now the main theorem reads as follows.
Theorem 2.1 Under assumptions A, for every spread functional Ψ(., .) that
is compatible with properties P1, and satisfies properties P2, an equilibrium
concave set function µ∗ ∈ C(Ψ) exists. When the riskless bond in redundant,
i.e. (1, 1, . . . , 1)t ∈< A >, then there exists a concave signed capacity ν∗ such
that the equilibrium price of a portfolio z ∈ IRJ , equals q∗rb
∫
Azdν∗, where q∗rb
denotes the equilibrium price of the riskless bond.
Proof: Definition 2.3 combined with lemma 2.1 implies that, for a given
Ψ(., .) that is compatible with P1, budget sets can be rewritten as follows,
Bi(π, πd) :=
(x, z) ∈ IRS+1+ × IRJ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ x0 ≤ w
i
0 − π(Az)−Ψ(π,Az) + ξ
iπd
xs ≤ wis + (Az)s, s ∈ Ω
 ,
where the vector π ∈ IRS now becomes the equilibrium variable. Since
Ψ(., .) is compatible with P1, it follows from theorem 3 in De Waegenaere and
Wakker (1996) that Ψ(π, .) is a convex function for all π ∈ IRS. Assumptions
A and the fact that Ψ(., .) is compatible with properties P1 therefore imply
that budget sets are non-empty, closed and convex for every π ∈ IRS and
every πd ≥ 0. Furthermore, property P22 implies that potential equilibrium
values for πA are bounded. Existence of an equilibrium π∗ can therefore be
shown following the lines of Werner (1985). An equilibrium µ∗ is then given
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by µ∗(A) := π∗1A + Ψ(π∗, 1A) for all A ∈ 2Ω, where 1A satisfies (1A)s = 1 for
s ∈ A and (1A)s = 0 for s ∈ Ω \A.
Now let µ∗ ∈ C(Ψ) be an equilibrium set function. It then follows that
the equilibrium price of the riskless bond is given by q∗rb =
∫
(1, 1, . . . , 1)tdµ∗ =
µ∗(Ω). By no-arbitrage arguments, clearly q∗rb > 0. Then corollary 2.1 says





for all X ∈ IRS. This yields the desired result.
3 Constrained Pareto optimality
In this section, we address the issue of Pareto optimality. The example in
the next section shows that, even with complete markets, one cannot expect
to have Pareto optimality. In this model, there are three sources of Pareto
inefficiency. The first one is the incompleteness of the market. The second
one is the redistribution of the dealer’s profit according to the shares in the
dealer’s firm. The last one is the fact that the presence of frictions indirectly
limits the level of transactions. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 3.1 At a set function µ : 2Ω → IR, and dealer’s profit πd ∈ IR+,

























We can show the following.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that µ∗ is an equilibrium set function, and let (x∗, z∗, µ∗, πd∗)
satisfy i), ii), iii) and iv) in definition 2.2. Then there does not exist an al-
location x̃ ∈ F(µ∗, πd∗) such that ui(x̃i) ≥ ui(x∗i) for all i ∈ I with at least
one strict inequality.
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Proof: Goes along the usual lines.
Notice that this concept of constrained Pareto optimality is similar to
notions of second order optimality in the context of markets with taxation
(see for instance Guesnerie (1994)).
4 Example
In the following example, we compute all equilibrium concave set functions
for a specified economy, and show that the only Pareto optimal equilibrium
is the one that corresponds to no bid-ask spreads.
Consider a market with two agents, two assets, one good and two states
of the world at date one. There is no consumption at date zero. The date
one endowment of agent 1 is given by (0, 2)t. The date one endowment of
agent 2 is given by (1, 0)t.
Agent 1 has utility function u1(x1, x2) := 2 ln(x1) + ln(x2). Agent 2 has
utility function u2(x1, x2) := ln(x1) + 2 ln(x2). The dealer’s firm is owned by
agent two, i.e. ξ2 = 1, and ξ1 = 0. The asset payoffs are given by: A1 = (1, 0)t
and A2 = (0, 1)t. We consider price functionals q(.) given by q(X) =
∫
Xdµ
for all X ∈ IRS, where the concave set function µ is the equilibrium variable.
Notice that, for a given concave set function µ, the price functional equals
q(X) =
∫
Xdµ = πX + γ|X2 − X1|, with π1 = µ({1, 2}) − µ({2}), π2 =
µ({1, 2}) − µ({1}), and γ = µ({1}) + µ({2}) − µ({1, 2}). On the other
hand, for any γ ≥ 0, the above used spread functional is compatible with
a concave set function. Since there is no consumption at date zero, we can
without loss of generality normalize the price of the riskless bond (1, 1)t to
1, i.e.
∫
(1, 1)tdµ = µ({1, 2}) = 1. In the sequel, we denote µ1 = µ({1}), and
µ2 = µ({2}). It is straightforward to see that the equilibria in this economy
13







































, πd = 3µ2 − 1.

























, πd = 0,
i.e., it is the unique equilibrium where there is no bid-ask spread (πd = 0),
and for this equilibrium the set function mu is a probability measure, since
then µ1 + µ2 = 1 = µ({1, 2}).
Remark: The multiplicity of equilibria is a result of the fact that we allow
for µ1 +µ2 > 1, i.e. we allow for spreads, and consequently µ is allowed to be
a concave signed capacity instead of a probability measure. When restricting
to µ1 + µ2 = 1, one gets a unique equilibrium (without spreads).
5 Conclusion
Asset pricing with transaction costs or bid-ask spreads has been widely de-
veloped recently (see for example Boyle and Vorst (1992) and Bensaid et al.
(1992)). However, the link between asset pricing and equilibrium on mar-
kets with frictions has not been given much attention. This paper provides
such a link. It is shown that a non-linear pricing rule, Choquet pricing, can
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be used to price redundant assets in a way consistent with equilibrium. The
rule essentially amounts to replacing the risk-neutral probability distribution
appearing in no-arbitrage pricing by a concave signed capacity. It is shown
that ”equilibrium” signed capacities exist, and that the equilibrium alloca-
tions satisfy a notion of Pareto optimality that is very similar to notions of
Pareto optimality appearing in the taxation literature.
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